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RECENT CASES
PASSAGE OF LAPSED SHARE IN RESIDUE

Testator directed in his will that the residue of his estate was to be
divided into one hundred equal parts, and distributed among individual
beneficiaries. Five of the shares were to be held in trust for the benefit
of a foster son, and upon his death, for his children. The trust created a
life state in the foster son with a contingent remainder in his unborn
children, leaving a reversion in the testator. All the residuary legatees.
including the foster son were alive at the time of the testator's death. Since
the foster son left no children at his death, the life estate terminated and
the interest reverted to the testator's estate. However, the court treated the
reversion as a lapse of the legacy. 1 Held, that the lapsed share shall continue to be a part of the residue, and be distributed among the surviving
residuary legatees. Commerce National Bank v. Browning, 107 N.E. 2d 120
(Ohio 1952).
The principle that any lapse in the residuary clause does not inure
to the benefit of the remaining residuary legatees but passes as if there
had been an intestacy has been established by the English courts. 2 The
rule has no application to lapsed residuary legacies where the legatees take
as joint tenants or as members of a class. In that situation, the lapsed share
remains in the residue and is distributed among the joint tenants who
survive.3 Also, a testamentary gift outside the residue which lapses will
fall into the residue, and is not subjected to the principle. 4 A probate
court in a state which has an anti-lapse statute may apply such statute to
the situation where one of the residuary legatees has predeceased the testator, and would prevent the lapsed residuary share from passing intestate.
Instead, the share would pass to the party or parties designated by the
anti-lapse statute. The reason for the rule is not clear. Perhaps the
English courts felt that the testator desired that the surviving residuary
legatees be limited to the original legacy as devised in the will, and therefore the testator's unexpressed intention should be carried out. The English
courts applied the principle to the proper situation without hesitation
before the turn of the century; but since then some of the courts have
shown reluctance in its application. 6 American courts have generally
L. The term "lapse" indicates that a legatee or devisee died before the testator, and
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

the gift fails to vest. However, the courts have applied the term to other situations,
as was done in the instant case. 57 Am. Jur. 954.
Skrymsher v. Northcoate, 1 Swanst. 566 (1818); Bagwell v. Dry, I P. Wms. 700,
24 Eng. Rep. 700 (1721).
Hoerman's Estate, 234 Wi' 130, 290 N. W. 608 (1940); 57 Am. Jur. 978.
In re Quick's Estate, 33 Wash. 2d 568, 206 P.2d 489 (1949); 57 Am. Jur. 971.
Schneller v. Schneller, 356 Ill. 89, 190 N.E. 121, 92 A.L.R. 838 (1934); see note,
139 A.L.R. 873.
"The arguments by which this rule was arrived at are perfectly intelligent, and one
may say, plausible, nevertheless, I think that the effect of it is to defeat the testator's
intention in almost every case in which it is applied, but it is a rule by which I am
undoubtedly bound." In re Dunster, 1 Ch. 103 (1909).
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adopted this principle; but the reasons they have used for its application
do not appear to be too clear, except that it must be followed as the common law.7
A growing minority of American courts do not feel obligated to follow
the rule merely because it is the common law.8 Several state courts
have rejected the rule by judicial decision. 9 Ohio and Rhode Island have
changed the rule by statute. 10 The court in the instant case, in rejecting
the rule, brings out the fact that the testator probably intended to dispose
of all his propery by his will, and even though a lapse has occurred such
share should be distributed among the surviving residuary legatees."
The objections to the rule may be summed us by the statement set forth
2
in the case of Corbett v. Skaggs:'
"That the share of a deceased residuary legatee cannot fall
into the residue because it is itself a part of the residue, appears
to be a mere play upon words than to point out of real difficulty."
The problem of a lapse in the residuary clause of a will may have
arisen in the probate courts of Wyoming in the past but a search revealed
no cases decided by the Wyoming Supreme Court. The common law
would probably be followed, 13 but since there has been much criticism of
the rule, which is technical in its nature and of doubtful value, it would
seem best to overcome it by legislation or by decision. Judge V. J. Tidball
stated in an article' 4 that since the Wyoming legislature has not passed
an anti-lapse statute, the drawer of a will can overcome the problem of
a lapse of a legacy outside the residue by the use of proper language. He
stated that:
"... The law seems fairly well settled that in cases where the
will leaves property to a named person 'or his heirs', on the death
of the donee before that of the testator, the property bequeathed
to the named deceased person goes to his heirs; but where it is
left to a named person 'and his heirs' upon the death of the named
donee before that of the testator, the gift lapses."
The lawyer in Wyoming who drafts a will can overcome the problem
of a lapse in the residue by including a provision to protect such a lapse
from passing intestate. A clause in the will to the effect that, "if any
7.
8.

9.
10.

11.
12.
13.
14.

In re Boyle, 123 Colo. 448, 231 P.2d 465 (1951).
"The rule is in fact a concession to the set policy of English law, nowhere more
severly asserted than in chancery to keep the devolution of property in the regular
channels, to the heirs and the next of kin, whenever it can be done." Gray's Estate,
147 Pa. 47, 23 A. 205 (1892).
Corbett v. Skaggs, 111 Kan. 380, 207 Pac. 819 (1922); In re Zimmerman's Estate, 122
Neb. 812, 241 N.W. 553 (1932); Gray et al v. Bailey et al, 42 Ind. 349 (1872);
Will of Neilsen, 256 Wis. 54, 41 N.W. 2d 369 (1950).
R. I. Gen. Law c. 566, sec. 7 (1938); Ohio General Code Ann. sec. 10504-73 (1938).
The Ohio court in the principle case did not apply this statute. An application was
not appropriate to the factual situation of that case. The statute is applicable only
when an actual lapse in the residue occurs.
Commerce National Bank v. Browning, 107 N.E. 120, 125 (Ohio, 1952).
Corbett v. Skaggs, 111 Kan. 380, 207 Pac. 819 (1922).
Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, sec. 16-301.
2 Wyo. L. J. 60 (1947).
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residuary devise or legacy under this will shall lapse, such devise or legacy
shall pass to the surviving devisees or legatees in proportion to their respective interests in such residue" would suffice.
BOB DUNCAN

ROYALTY INTEREST-REAL OR PERSONAL

Lessee was the producer of oil and gas. The lease expressly provided
that the lessee was to pay all taxes assessed and levied upon said lands. For
a period of several years the lessee deducted from the account with the lessor
a proportionate amount of the gross products tax levied by the State on the
oil and gas produced. Suit was then brought to recover this deduction,
the lessor claiming that the gross products tax was upon realty. Held: that
the gross products tax is on personalty. Oregon Basin Oil and Gas Co. v.
Ohio Oil Co., 248 P.2d 198 (Wyo. 1952).
The Supreme Court states in this case. that the question as to whether
or not a royalty interest in oil lands is real or personal property, if discussed in general terms, may prove to be more confusing than helpful.'
The Court chose instead to look at the principles of law applicable in
Wyoming which are the result of its own constitutional 2 and statutory3
construction.4
In the case of State v. Snyder,5 it was held that the royalties should be
considered as realty. However, this case dealt with the constitutional provision6 that all moneys from the sale or lease of school lands should belong
to the perpetual funds for school purposes. The Court said that oil and
gas, while in situ, are a part of the realty. If taken and disposed of the
7
effect is clearly a permanent disposition of land.
The Wyoming Constitution provided that there should be a tax on the
gross products of mines and mineral claims as may be prescribed by law
instead of a tax upon the real estate.8 The original statute 9 provided for
taxation of the gross products of, among other things, oil and gas, and for
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
-6.
7.
8.
9.

Oregon Basin Oil and Gas Co. v. Ohio Oil Co., 248 P.2d 198 (Wyo. 1952).
Wyo. Const. Art 15, Secs. 1 & 3.
Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, secs. 32-1001 to 1006.
See 4 Wyo. L. J. 250 for a discussion of Wyoming's Gross Products Tax.
State v. Snyder, 29 Wyo. 163, 212 Pac. 758 (1923).
Wyo. Const. Art. 7, Sec. 2.
State v. Snyder, 29 Wyo. 163, 212 Pac. 758 (1923).
Wyo. Const., Art. 15, Sec. 3.
Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, sec. 32-1001 (enacted in 1903): "The gross product of all
mines and mining claims from which . . . coal, petroleum, or other crude mineral
oil, or natural gas, or other valuable deposit is, or may hereafter be produced, while
the same are being worked or operated, but not while the same are simply in the
course of development, shall be returned by the owner, owners, lessee, or operator
thereof for assessment for taxation, and taxed in the manner provided for in this
Article, and such tax shall be in addition to any tax which may be assessed upon
the surface improvements of such mines or mining claims, and in lieu of taxes upon
the land of such claims while the same are being worked or operated: . . ."

